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Executive summary 
As we rely more and more on information and communication technology, cybersecurity becomes both 
essential and problematic to our societies. On the one hand, cybersecurity is essential to prevent cyber 
threats from undermining citizens’ trust and confidence not only in the digital infrastructure but in policy 
makers and state authorities as well. On the other hand, cybersecurity is problematic because enforcing 
it may endanger fundamental values like equality, fairness, autonomy, or privacy. 
The CANVAS project aims to foster value-driven cybersecurity, with respect to European values and 
fundamental rights. Its first milestone is to consolidate existing knowledge and data related to cyberse-
curity in four areas, namely the ethical, legal, empirical, and technological domains.  
This White Paper summarises currently available empirical data about attitudes and opinions of citizens 
and state actors regarding cybersecurity. It describes what these stakeholders generally think, what they 
feel, and what they do about cyber threats and security (counter)measures. For citizens’ perspectives, 
three social spheres of particular interest are examined: 1) health, 2) business, 3) police and national 
security. 
This unique synthesis builds on a variety of sources with both quantitative and qualitative data. For 
citizens’ perspectives, our sources include reports from EU projects and Eurobarometer surveys, as well 
as additional scientific papers. As for state actors’ perspectives, they rely essentially on policy docu-
ments, as they are the most relevant data available. 
In the general conclusion, we sum up our main findings and suggest four consequent actions: 
1. We need to improve awareness about cybersecurity: more information about current risks and 
concrete measures should be provided to a broader public.  
2. We ought to keep a holistic view on all value-related topics: we should not have to choose be-
tween (cyber)security and privacy, or any other value. 
3. Most found data relates to general issues of security and privacy; therefore, further empirical 
research is needed to cover other values, but also to investigate specific issues such as in health 
or business. 
4. In line with the Standard Data Protection Model, three new protection goals should be added 
to the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability): unlinkability, intervenability, and trans-
parency. Thus, privacy and security can be mutually reinforcing. 
Ultimately, working towards value-driven cybersecurity goes beyond adding privacy requirements, alt-
hough it is a first, significant and welcome step. Both citizens’ perspectives and their direct involvement 
are crucial to enforce fundamental rights in the cyberspace and to contribute to a secure, value-driven 
information society. 
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CANVAS White Papers – Overview 
In order to summarize the existing literature on the topics and issues that are relevant for the CANVAS 
project, the CANVAS consortium has created four White Papers as follows: 
- White Paper 1 – Cybersecurity and Ethics: This White Paper outlines how the ethical discourse 
on cybersecurity has developed in the scientific literature, which ethical issues gained interest, 
which value conflicts are discussed, and where the “blind spots” in the current ethical discourse 
on cybersecurity are located. The White Paper is based on an extensive literature with a focus 
on three reference domains with unique types of value conflicts: health, business/finance and 
national security. For each domain, a systematic literature search has been performed and the 
identified papers have been analysed using qualitative and quantitative methods. An important 
observation is that the ethics of cybersecurity not an established subject. In all domains, cyber-
security is recognized as being an instrumental value, not an end in itself, which opens up the 
possibility of trade-offs with different values in different spheres. The most prominent common 
theme is the existence of trade-offs and even conflicts between reasonable goals, for example 
between usability and security, accessibility and security, privacy and convenience. Other prom-
inent common themes are the importance of cybersecurity to sustain trust (in institutions), and 
the harmful effect of any loss of control over data. 
- White Paper 2 – Cybersecurity and Law: This White Paper explores the legal dimensions of the 
European Union (EU)’s value-driven cybersecurity. It identifies main critical challenges in this 
area and discusses specific controversies concerning cybersecurity regulation. The White Paper 
recognises that legislative and policy measures within the cybersecurity domain challenge EU 
fundamental rights and principles, stemming from EU values. Annexes provide a review on EU 
soft-law measures, EU legislative measures, cybersecurity and criminal justice affairs, the rela-
tion of cybersecurity to privacy and data protection, cybersecurity definitions in national cyber-
security strategies, and brief descriptions of EU values. 
- White Paper 3 – Attitudes and Opinions regarding Cybersecurity: This White Paper summarises 
currently available empirical data about attitudes and opinions of citizens and state actors re-
garding cybersecurity. The data emerges from reports of EU projects, Eurobarometer surveys, 
policy documents of state actors and additional scientific papers. It describes what these stake-
holders generally think, what they feel, and what they do about cyber threats and security 
(counter)measures. For citizens’ perspectives, three social spheres of particular interest are ex-
amined: 1) health, 2) business, 3) police and national security.  
- White Paper 4 – Technological Challenges in Cybersecurity: This White Paper summarizes the 
current state of discussion regarding the main technological challenges in cybersecurity and 
impact of those, including ways and approaches to addressing them, on key fundamental val-
ues. It provides an overview on current cybersecurity threads and countermeasures and focuses 
on ethical dilemmas that emerge when counteracting those threads. It also points to the fact 
that the cybersecurity community relies much more on interpersonal relations when sharing 
intelligence and data than in explicit national or supranational regulations. Furthermore, the 
White Paper presents advanced cryptographic techniques and data anonymization techniques 
that may help to solve or minimize some of the ethical dilemmas. 
All White Papers and additional material are available at the Website of the CANVAS project: www.can-
vas-project.eu 
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1. Introduction 
The digitalisation of modern life brings many changes and challenges. As we rely more and more on 
information and communication technology (ICT), cybersecurity becomes both essential and problem-
atic to our societies. On the one hand, cybersecurity is essential to prevent cyber threats from under-
mining citizens’ trust and confidence not only in the digital infrastructure but in policy makers and state 
authorities as well. On the other hand, cybersecurity is problematic because enforcing it may endanger 
other fundamental values like autonomy, equality, fairness, or privacy. This is the reason why the CAN-
VAS project aims to foster value-driven cybersecurity. 
The first step of CANVAS is to consolidate existing knowledge and data related to cybersecurity in four 
domains: philosophical-ethical deliberations, legal knowledge, empirical research, and technology de-
velopment. This White Paper aims at summarising currently available empirical data on attitudes and 
opinions regarding cybersecurity. It is complementary with the three other White Papers dealing re-
spectively with the ethical, legal, and technological domains. Together, these four documents provide 
an enlightening multi-disciplinary view on current cybersecurity issues with respect to European values 
and fundamental rights. 
In this White Paper, we consider opinions and attitudes of European citizens and state actors on cyber-
security, i.e. what they think, what they feel, and what they do about cyber threats and security (coun-
ter) measures. As cybersecurity affects ICT applications in every social sphere, an exhaustive evaluation 
is not feasible. CANVAS focuses on three social spheres of reference, each with its unique types of values 
conflicts: 1) health, 2) business, 3) police and national security. 
Our synthesis builds on a variety of sources with both quantitative and qualitative data. For citizens’ 
perspectives, our sources include reports from former EU projects and Eurobarometer surveys, as well 
as additional scientific papers. We performed a tailored literature search in scientific databases, whose 
results were then filtered for each social sphere.1 As for state actors’ perspectives, they rely essentially 
on policy documents, as they are the most relevant data available. 
Of course, the proper interpretation of any empirical data is delicate. Surveys and polls only give a snap-
shot of the respondents’ answers to carefully crafted questions. Focus groups are more interactive and 
more instructive, but their participants are fewer and less representative of the general public. Such 
studies gather attitudes and opinions of particular people in particular places at particular times. If their 
sampling is adequate, we may generalise theirs results to the population studied, knowing that these 
results give a partial picture and may evolve over time. That being said, many results exposed in this 
White Paper reflect findings of large surveys: indeed, several EU projects used a sample of around 
27’000 respondents, with about 1’000 citizens from each EU27 member. These results might be influ-
enced by the intrinsic bias towards privacy of some of the surveys, especially those focussing on ways 
to go beyond the traditional trade-off between security and privacy. 
This White Paper presents the main findings of most relevant, existing studies. For the sake of brevity, 
we may speak of, for instance, “the opinion of citizens”, even though it would be scientifically more 
accurate to say “the answers of the respondents to this survey”. Moreover, we use the present tense 
everywhere and specify the date when original data was gathered. For more details, we refer the reader 
to the original publications where the mentioned data is thoroughly reported and analysed.2  
                                                          
 This introduction has been written by Florent WENGER and David-Olivier JAQUET-CHIFFELLE (University of Lausanne). 
1 See Appendix A.2: Literature Search Methodology. 
2 See Appendix A.4 References in the end. 
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2. Citizens on Cybersecurity in general 
In sections 2 to 5, we collate empirical data on EU citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity. The main 
issues which are reoccurring in the literature include privacy infringement, data processing, data collec-
tion, proportionality, risks, access, control, efficiency, and reliability of the technology. For the purposes 
of cohesiveness, we consider EU citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity in general before we present 
the results for the opinions towards cybersecurity regarding the three focused domains business, 
health, and national security. 
The Cyber Security Strategy proposed by the EU in 2013 notes that one of the main challenges in cyber-
security is the fact that cybercrime is high-profit and low-risk, and there is a lack of accountability which 
criminals often exploit.3 Cybercrime is now one of the fastest growing forms of crime with more than 
one million people worldwide falling victim each day.4 In order to combat cybercrime and increase the 
efficiency of cybersecurity, the Strategy recommends a coordinated collaborative approach stating that 
“security can only be ensured if all in the value chain (e.g. equipment manufacturers, software develop-
ers, information society services providers) make security a priority”.5 
Making a coordinated effort across many sectors to boost cybersecurity with the aim of preventing cy-
bercriminals from intruding into information systems, stealing critical data or holding companies to ran-
som may significantly reduce the potential of a cyberattack disrupting the supply of essential services 
we take for granted such as water, healthcare, electricity, or mobile services.6 However, a coordinated 
approach will not be successful without public engagement. The Strategy accepts that citizens need to 
have trust and confidence in the people and businesses which design, control and operate security tech-
nologies in order for citizens to adopt and engage with new technology.7  
The following section provides an overview on empirical research related to attitudes and opinions of 
EU citizens regarding cybersecurity in general. Therefore, we carried out a research on projects and 
surveys provided by the EU. It became apparent that the attitudes of citizens regarding cybersecurity 
are addressed, either to a greater or lesser extent, in many projects. The most relevant points are sum-
marized below. On account of the sufficient number of findings in this research step, an additional lit-
erature search was not required (in contrast to the health, business and national security spheres). 
 
2.1 Results from EU Projects and Surveys8 
It should be noted that the stated EU projects and surveys refer to each other; therefore, the projects 
will be presented both clustered and in chronological order. 
2.1.1 Eurobarometer 
Eurobarometer is a regularly published report of the European Commission to survey the public opinion 
by interviewing around 1,000 respondents per EU member state.9 
                                                          
 This section has been co-written by Nadine KLEINE (Regensburg University of Applied Science) and Gwenyth MORGAN (Dublin 
City University). 
3 ‘Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union’, European Commission. 
4 Ibid., p. 10. 
5 Ibid., p. 12. 
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
7 Ibid., p. 2. 
8 See Appendix A.1: EU projects overview, and A.4 References: EU projects. 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm 
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‘Flash Eurobarometer 225’, conducted in 2008, reveals that 64% of participants fear that organisations 
may handle their personal data inappropriately.10 There is consensus that personal data is best pro-
tected by medical services, doctors and public institutions and a large majority (82%) believe that data 
transmission over the web is not sufficiently secure.11 In respect of citizens’ ability to use security tech-
nologies, 22% of women answered that they would not know how to install security software on their 
computers. In respect of the belief that security technologies are effective, respondents who expressed 
uncertainty about the efficiency of the security oriented technologies were male and from the younger 
age groups.12 
‘Special Barometer 359’, conducted in 2011, reveals that four in ten internet users in the EU use strat-
egies and tools such as anti-spy software to reduce unwanted emails and spam, and/or try to ensure 
that a transaction is protected by looking out for a security logo or label.13 One fifth of the internet users 
change the security settings of their browser to increase privacy and avoid providing the same infor-
mation to different sites.14 Other “protection techniques” are cited by less than 15% of Europeans.15 
22% of internet users change the security settings of their browser to increase privacy and only 12% use 
a dummy email account.16 These numbers are very low and appear to be influenced by the security 
company in charge of the analysis of the data collected, i.e. citizens’ opinions vary depending on 
whether cybersecurity is operated by a public institution or a private institution. For example, 78% of 
Europeans trust health and medical institutions, 70% trust national public authorities such as tax au-
thorities and social security authorities.17 22% trust internet companies such as search engines, social 
networking sites, and email services.18 Seven in ten Europeans are concerned that companies may use 
their personal information for a purpose other than that for which it was originally collected without 
informing the citizens themselves (e.g. for direct marketing or targeted online advertising).19 In the 
event of a cyberattack or information leak, nine in ten Europeans want to be informed by a public au-
thority or by a private company if information held about them has been lost or stolen.20 
‘Special Eurobarometer 423’, conducted in 2014 and published in 2015, updates the previous study 
‘Special Eurobarometer 404’ from 2013 about cybersecurity.21 Simultaneously with an increasing num-
ber of internet access (from 72 to 76%), devices (especially smartphones from 35 to 61% and tablets 
from 14 to 30%) and online activities (e.g. social networks from 53 to 60%, buying goods or services 
from 50 to 57%), the concerns of EU citizens regarding internet transactions and cybercrime are rising.22 
The most common concerns are about the misuse of personal data (from 37 to 43%) and the security 
of online payments (from 35 to 42%); only 18% (2013: 23%) of the respondents have no concerns.23 
Asked about their agreement to concrete statements about attitudes to cybersecurity, 89% (2013: 87%) 
states that they avoid disclosing personal information and 85% (2013: 76%) perceive an increasing risk 
of becoming a victim of cybercrime. Concerns that personal information is not kept secure by websites 
are shared by 73% (2013: 70%) and are somewhat lower with regard to public authorities (67%; 2013: 
64%).24 The results of querying a list of concrete cybercrimes show that the majority of internet users 
                                                          
10 ‘Flash Eurobarometer 225: Data Protection in the European Union – Citizens’ Perception’, p. 5. 
11 Ibid., p. 8, 17.  
12 Ibid., p. 19. 
13 ‘Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union’, p. 106. 
14 Ibid., p. 110. 
15 Ibid., p. 135. 
16 Ibid., p. 107. 
17 Ibid., p. 138. 
18 Ibid., p. 141. 
19 Ibid., p. 146 
20 Ibid., p. 151, 154. 
21 ‘Special Eurobarometer 404: Cyber Security’. 
22 ‘Special Eurobarometer 423: Cyber Security’, p. 9, 13, 18. 
23 Ibid., p. 23f. 
24 Ibid., p. 45f. 
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have growing concerns about different sorts of crimes; they fear identity theft (68%; 2013: 52%), dis-
covering malicious software on their device (66%), being a victim of bank card or online banking fraud 
(63%, 2013: 49%) and a hacked social media or email account (60%, 2013: 45%).25 The number of re-
spondents who changed their online behaviour because of security concerns increased since 2013 from 
81 to 88% (largest growths: using anti-virus software from 46 to 61%, not opening emails from unknown 
people from 40 to 49%).26 Even though only 47% (2013: 44%) feel well informed about the risks of cy-
bercrime, around three in four internet users state to be able to protect themselves sufficiently.27 In 
case of becoming a victim of cybercrime, the respondents would, in most cases, contact the police (de-
pending on the sort of crime, between 37% by a hacked social media or email account and 84% in case 
if identity theft), followed by website or vendor and the internet service provider.28 
 
 
Figure 1: EU citizens and information about cybercrime29 
In ‘Special Eurobarometer 432’ from 2015, it becomes apparent that EU citizens perceive cybercrime as 
a significant threat in general, but they consider themselves also better informed (see Fig. 1): the open 
question for the (three) most important challenges to the security of the EU was answered by 12% with 
“cybercrime”.30 By the rating of the five main challenges, cybersecurity was with 80% the third most 
important internal security challenge; 63% of the respondents believe that cybercrime will increase.31 
For EU citizens, the entities that play an important role in ensuring security against cybercrime are the 
police (70%), the judicial system (64%), the army (47%) and the citizens themselves (46%) – although 
only 46% agree that the police are doing enough to fight cybercrime, while 40% do not think so.32  
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 54f. 
26 Ibid., p. 30. 
27 Ibid., p. 41f, 46. 
28 Ibid., p. 83-93. 
29 Source: ‘Special Eurobarometer 423: Cyber Security’, p. 41. 
30 ‘Special Eurobarometer 432: Europeans' Attitudes towards Security’, p. 19. 
31 Ibid., p. 23, 31. 
32 Ibid., p. 38f. 
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In the most recent report ‘Special Eurobarometer 464a’ from September 2017, the awareness regarding 
cybercrime in general increased again: Over eight in ten (87%) respondents see cybercrime as important 
and this is the case for a majority of respondents in every country. This proportion has increased by 
seven percentage points since March 2015.33 However, it is worth noting that the increase in concerns 
about these threats is steeper than the increase in the proportion of people who have actually been 
victims of the various kinds of cybercrime.  
2.1.2 PRISE and PRESCIENT 
Privacy concerns are an issue for EU citizens. For example, according to interview meetings conducted 
in 2007 within the EU project PRISE (which considered mass surveillance methods in the interests of 
national security), 85% of EU participants agree that privacy should not be violated without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal intent and 80% feel that it is unpleasant to be under surveillance stating that “par-
ticipants in general weigh privacy higher than security”.34 Participants differentiate serious crime from 
petty crime (e.g. speeding or shoplifting): petty crime is not considered a legitimate reason for privacy 
infringement whereas serious crime (unspecified) is.35 The issue of access is again raised in the context 
of what information is being collected by security companies and what harm could come from the po-
tential misuse of same.36 The report also notes that EU citizens believe “physically intimate technologies 
are unacceptable, [the] misuse of technology must be prevented and function creep is not accepta-
ble”.37 
In 2012, PRESCIENT found that the majority of EU citizens lack an adequate understanding of how data 
processing and security utilities operate, stating that this limits the ability of the individual to “rationally 
balance each transaction for benefits and consequences”.38 Participants reaffirm the opinion that they 
are uncomfortable with the idea of being under surveillance.39 
2.1.3 CONSENT – SMART – RESPECT 
The relevant EU projects presented below are all part of the 7th Programme for Research and Techno-
logical Development, in which research projects regarding specific thematic areas were generated. The 
CONSENT, SMART, and RESPECT projects all deal with different perspectives on privacy and new tech-
nologies such as security and surveillance, therefore their implications are brought together.40 
The CONSENT project ran from 2010 until 2013 and attempted to analyse online consumer behaviour 
by, amongst others, querying consumers’ attitudes towards personal privacy.41 A part of the project was 
a study ran in 2011 about awareness, values and attitudes of user generated content (UGC) website 
users towards privacy. With a combination of quantitative and qualitative research, 8,641 individuals 
from 26 EU countries were questioned.42 The respondents are “above-average frequency internet us-
ers”: 87% created an account with a social networking site.43 Among the reasons why they would not 
use these accounts, trust issues only plays a minor role (8%), a bigger role among the reasons for delet-
ing the accounts (30%).44 The types of information that they disclose the most are name (83%), email 
                                                          
33 ‘Special Eurobarometer 464a: Europeans' Attitudes towards Security’, p. 5. 
34 ‘PRISE D-5.8: Synthesis report – interview meetings on security technology and privacy’, p. 20. 
35 Ibid., p. 22. 
36 Ibid., p. 25. 
37 Ibid., p. 33. 
38 ‘PRESCIENT D-3: Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and emerging technologies’, p. v. 
39 Ibid., p. 48.  
40 http://respectproject.eu/research-content/working-packages/consolidation-of-smart-consent-and-respect/  
41 ‘CONSENT D-7.3: Synthesised all countries report’. 
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
43 Ibid., p. 3, 15. 
44 Ibid., p. 16-18. 
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address (79%), and photos of themselves (68%).45 Nevertheless, the disclosure of personal information 
is perceived as high risk (5.2 - 6.1 on a scale 1 - 7); for the respondents it is likely to happen that infor-
mation being shared is used to send you unwanted commercial offers (81%), that it is used without the 
user’s knowledge (74%), and that it is shared with third parties without the user’s agreement.46 74% are 
aware that the information they include on a website may be used for other purposes, 53% are changing 
the privacy settings47 on UGC websites often or always, 18% rarely or never.48 Only 11% of the respond-
ents state to always read terms of conditions of a website; the majority rarely or never read them. 89% 
of those who read them indicate that they do not (fully) understand the privacy policies.49 
The aim of the SMART project, which ran from 2011 until 2014, was to examine social and legal conse-
quences of adopting automated, “smart surveillance” systems by public bodies.50 Part of the project 
was an evaluation of citizens’ attitudes towards smart surveillance and privacy via 42 focus group dis-
cussions with 353 participants in 14 European countries. The participants showed a high awareness of 
the current state of surveillance, especially as users of mobile devices and internet services.51 Individu-
als, at least in part, are considered as responsible for their own personal (online) data. Surveillance in 
public places, unlike private places, is mostly accepted, especially if the monitoring is transparent; sur-
veillance for safety reasons is more accepted than for commercial objectives. Dataveillance is perceived 
as a threat to privacy, even though most participants believe that the recent legal restrictions are suffi-
cient. The acceptance of data sharing and collecting is dependent of the type of data (mostly unaccepta-
ble by sensitive data, anonymized data more accepted), the purpose of use (e.g. acceptable by life-
saving circumstances), the conducting entity (state actors in general more trustworthy than private ac-
tors) and a given consent. The approval of surveillance technologies differs between different types: the 
more intrusive the technology, the bigger the aversion to it. The concept that more surveillance leads 
necessarily to more security was opposed by the majority.52 
Building on the results of CONSENT and SMART, RESPECT explored the European citizens’ awareness 
and acceptance of surveillance systems and procedures, with additional questionnaires and interviews 
in 28 European countries (5,361 participants) in 2013-2014.53 It becomes apparent that the majority 
have knowledge about the different types of surveillance and the reasons for it (especially detection, 
prosecution and reduction of crime).54 23% of the respondents feel secure due to surveillance whereas 
37% feel insecure; they perceive a lack of control over their personal information and mistrust govern-
ment agencies and, to a greater extent, private companies.55 Surveillance by government agencies is 
more accepted (just 6%: “not acceptable under any circumstances”) than by private companies (16%: 
“not acceptable under any circumstances”); the approval decreases even more if the surveillance hap-
pens without knowledge of the affected people.56 Moreover, the acceptance is dependent on the loca-
tion: both CCTV and geolocation surveillance are least accepted in the workplace, most accepted in 
clinics and hospitals.57 The risk that information gathered via surveillance could be intentionally misused 
(6.0 on a scale of 1 - 7) and that that they could be misinterpreted (6.0) are perceived as the highest 
ones, followed by violation of a person’s privacy (5.9) and violation of the citizens’ right to control 
                                                          
45 Ibid., p. 19. 
46 Ibid., p. 20-23. 
47 Change to stricter settings: 79.7%, to less strict settings: 3% (ibid., p. 31). 
48 Ibid., p. 23f, 30f. 
49 Ibid., p. 32f. 
50 ‘SMART: Report summary’. 
51 Ibid., p. 8f. 
52 Ibid., p. 9. 
53 ‘RESPECT: Periodic report summary 1’. 
54 Ibid., p. 13f. 
55 Ibid., p. 17f, 25. 
56 Ibid., p. 18, 26f. 
57 Ibid., p. 28. 
White Paper 3 – Attitudes & Opinions 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540   11
whether information about them is used (5.7).58 While the majority believe that surveillance takes place 
often or all the time (depending on the type of technology), only the minority feel well informed and 
confident about the effectiveness of laws and regulations and just a few respondents changed their 
behaviour due to surveillance.59 Social benefits (protection both for the individual citizen and the com-
munity) and social costs (limitation of rights, violation of privacy and control over personal data, misuse 
and misinterpretation, discrimination and stigma) of surveillance are both perceived without balancing 
them against each other.60 
2.1.4 SurPRISE – PRISMS – PACT 
The EU projects SurPRISE, PRISMS and PACT also belong to the FP7 programme and ran between 2012 
and 2015. They aimed to examine the relationship between security and privacy, especially the idea of 
a “trade-off” between these values.61 Not only were they all acknowledged in the above-mentioned 
research of RESPECT, but they also organised a joint final conference about “Citizens’ perspectives on 
surveillance, security and privacy”.62 
Looking at the adoption of security technologies in surveillance and how they are viewed by citizens, 
the SurPRISE project investigated European attitudes towards the employment of surveillance-oriented 
security technologies (SOSTs): smart CCTV, deep packet inspection (DPI) and smart phone location track-
ing (SLT).63 In 2014, it found that citizens would prefer if SOSTs were evaluated before implementation, 
paying particular attention to the purpose, appropriateness, cost, and impact of SOSTs.64 Participants 
would also prefer verification of what data and information is being collected by SOSTs, be aware of 
who is responsible of such data and for what purpose the data is being collected.65 Participants com-
ment on the intrusiveness and usefulness of each SOST: all three SOSTs are considered useful but highly 
intrusive, with DPI receiving the highest perceived level of intrusiveness (66% of participants).66 In rela-
tion to effectiveness and future use and potential abuse of DPI, 43% of citizens state that DPI is an 
effective security tool despite 66% feeling uncomfortable with the use of DPI.67 84% are worried about 
the extension and future use of DPI and 70% of participants share the opinion that SOSTs are likely to 
be abused.68 70% are concerned about extensive information collections, 63% fear that information 
held about them might be inaccurate, near to 80% fear that their personal information might be used 
against them and 91% are concerned that their information is shared without their permission.69 50% 
of participants disagree with the statement “if you have done nothing wrong you do not have to worry 
about surveillance-oriented security technologies” with only 34% agreeing with this statement.70 What 
is interesting is that 52% of the “nothing to hide” supporters are at the same time concerned that too 
much information is collected about them, which is contradictory.71 Some participants also feel that 
SOSTs are forced upon them.72 
                                                          
58 Ibid., p. 30f. 
59 Ibid., p. 23f, 31. 
60 Ibid., p. 32. 
61 ‘SurPRISE: Report summary’. ‘PRISMS: Report summary’. ‘PACT: Final report summary’. 
62 ‘SurPRISE, PRISMS and PACT: Abstract booklet’. 
63 ‘SurPRISE D-6.10: Synthesis report’, p. i, ii. 
64 Ibid., p. iii. 
65 Ibid., p. iii, iv. 
66 Ibid., p. 27. 
67 Ibid., p. 28. 
68 Ibid., p. 31. 
69 Ibid., p. 33. 
70 Ibid., p. 34. 
71 Ibid., p. 39. 
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In 2014, the PRISMS project explored EU citizens’ perceptions of privacy and security issues, gathering 
data from focus groups and 27,000 respondents (1,000 per EU27 member state).73 32% of participants 
are worried about someone hacking into their computer, 62% of participants feel that it is important 
that they have the freedom to use the internet anonymously, and 81% state that it is important that 
they know who has information about them.74 80% of participants state that internet service providers 
(ISPs) selling customer information should not occur and 75% of respondents believe that this practice 
threatens people’s rights and freedoms.75 Again, citizens distinguish between security technologies and 
practices operated by public and private sector institutions: citizens have more trust that public author-
ities will respect citizens’ right to privacy and data protection and, similarly to previous studies, citizens 
oppose covert surveillance practices and secondary use of data, especially for commercial purposes.76 
This study also affirms that citizens seem to present a high level of resistance to private sector actors 
who collect and process personal data and, while a concern for security decreases resistance, a high 
level of trust in institutions also decreases resistance.77 
In 2013, the PACT project examined the European citizens’ perception of the relation between privacy, 
fundamental rights, and security by surveying 27,000 EU citizens (1,000 per EU27 member state) on 
their attitudes towards scenarios regarding travel, internet service provider, and health.78 It becomes 
apparent that the attitudes towards the collection and storage of personal data as well as the access to 
data are dependent on the specific context. The collection and storage of personal data is rather ac-
cepted in the context of traveling (presence of CCTV) and health (storage on devices or systems), but 
not on internet usage (especially in the long run).79 The respondents are averse to access to CCTV and 
internet usage data by the police (especially outside the home country); an EU-wide access to health 
data is accepted, but for medical personnel only.80 Moreover, the study shows a correlation between 
general attitudes towards privacy, surveillance and trust and their chosen preferences, which rejects 
the trade-off model of security and privacy. For example, a traveling person who is concerned about 
misuse of data shows weaker preferences towards CCTV cameras than somebody with concerns about 
misuse of security measures for sexual or racial harassment.81  
 
2.2 Discussion and conclusion 
The research in empirical studies regarding attitudes and opinions towards cybersecurity seems to show 
that EU citizens perceive an increasing threat of cybercrime. 
There is a number of stated risks (e.g. identity theft, online fraud), but the biggest one by far is privacy 
violation and loss of data control, especially the misuse of private data. The perception of surveillance 
depends on different factors: the entity and context of surveillance, the sort of data and the level of 
transparency about the surveillance methods. Transparent collection of non-intrusive data for security 
reasons by public authorities meets with the highest acceptance, while non-transparent collection of 
sensitive data by commercial institutions receives the lowest acceptance. The given consent of the af-
fected citizens is perceived as crucial. There is an awareness about both the social benefits and the social 
costs of data collection and surveillance. The trade-off model between security and privacy is rejected 
to a large extent. 
                                                          
73 ‘PRISMS D-10.1: Report on statistical analysis of survey’, p. 5. 
74 Ibid., p. 27, 30. 
75 Ibid., p. 35. 
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For most of the respondents, the importance of cybersecurity measures is constantly increasing. The 
vast majority wants to be informed about cybersecurity risks, but only a smaller part feels sufficiently 
informed. The trust in authorities which ensure cybersecurity shows a broad range: while trust in public 
authorities and medical institutions is moderately high, trust in private authorities and commercial in-
stitutions is low. In general, trust in sufficient legal restrictions regarding cybersecurity and data protec-
tion is very high.  
The responsibility for cybersecurity is not just attributed to institutions, but also to the individuals them-
selves. However, the changes in online behaviour and processing of personal data are not carried 
through: some security measures, e.g. changing of private settings, are more popular than others, like 
reading terms of conditions before accepting them. 
It appears that the average knowledge about the concrete possibilities and functionalities of cyberse-
curity measures is deficient. Therefore, more information about cybersecurity risks and concrete 
measures should be provided for the broad population. 
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3. Citizens on cybersecurity in health 
The following section provides an overview on empirical research related to attitudes and opinions of 
EU citizens regarding cybersecurity in health. This includes two main parts: the first step consists of a 
research on projects and surveys provided by the EU, the second step is an additional research into 
academic literature. As it became apparent that there are hardly any existing empirical results directly 
related to attitudes and opinions of EU citizens regarding cybersecurity and the domain of health, it is 
necessary to take into account partial results of existing surveys which are linked to a greater or a lesser 
extent to the topic of interest.  
 
3.1. Results from EU Projects and Surveys82 
It should be noted that the stated EU projects and surveys refer to each other. Therefore, the projects 
will be presented both clustered and in chronological order. 
3.1.1 Eurobarometer 
An important survey regarding attitudes towards data is to be found in ‘Flash Eurobarometer 225’.83 In 
2008, EU citizens were asked, among others things, about their trust in organisations concerning data 
protection. They perceive that their personal data is best protected by medical authorities, e.g. medical 
services and doctors (82%), whereas insurance companies are less so (51%), and private companies, e.g. 
mail order companies, are the least trustworthy (24%).84 
In 2010, a part of the survey for ‘Special Eurobarometer 341’ polled the attitudes towards biobanks. The 
most preferred group to protect public interest in the use of biobanks are medical professionals (39%), 
the second one researchers (32%), the third one public institutions (26%).85 67% state that researchers 
should ask for informed consent for every new piece of research (18% “ask for permission only once”, 
6% “no need to ask for permission”).86 The question “Would you be willing to provide information about 
yourself to a biobank?” is answered by 46% with yes and by 44% with no.87 Respondents are mostly 
concerned about the collection of their personal genetic profile (34%) and personal medical records 
(33%), while 28 % are not concerned at all about personal information being stored in biobanks. How-
ever, 53% agree that the exchange of personal data and biological materials tissue across member states 
should be encouraged (while 32% opposed).88 
Another relevant survey is ‘Special Eurobarometer 359’, conducted in 2011. Being asked which infor-
mation they consider personal, the respondents name medical information (patient records and health 
information) as the second most personal (74%) after financial information (75%).89 Appropriately, the 
percentage of people disclosing their medical information on the internet is very low at 5% (in compar-
ison: name is 79%, personal photos is 51%).90 Similarly to ‘Flash Eurobarometer 225’, the trust in differ-
                                                          
 This section has been written by Nadine KLEINE and Karsten WEBER (Regensburg University of Applied Science). 
82 See Appendix A.1: EU projects overview, and A.4 References: EU projects. 
83 ‘Flash Eurobarometer 225: Data Protection in the European Union – Citizens’ Perception’. 
84 Ibid., p. 10f. 
85 ‘Special Eurobarometer 341: Biotechnology’, p. 144-146. 
86 Ibid., p. 142f. 
87 Ibid., p. 147f. 
88 Ibid., p. 149-152, 151f. 
89 ‘Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union’, p. 12, 15f. 
90 Ibid., p. 39f. 
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ent authorities is addressed: health and medical institutions are deemed the most trustworthy author-
ities regarding protection of personal data with 78%. In comparison: the second most trustworthy au-
thorities are national public authorities with 70%, the least trustworthy authorities are internet compa-
nies (e.g. search engines, social networking sites) with 22%.91 After being asked whether their specific 
approval should be required before any kind of personal information is collected and processed, 74% 
say in every case, and 8% in cases regarding sensitive information such as health information.92 The vast 
majority (88%) affirm the request for whether genetic information (e.g. DNA data) should have the same 
protection as sensitive data.93 
3.1.2 CONSENT – SMART – RESPECT 
According to the CONSENT study from 2011, any disclosure of personal information is considered as 
risky: sharing of data without knowledge or consent is perceived as riskier (73 - 81%) than personal risks, 
e.g. fraud or discrimination (23 - 32%). Regarding which types of information they already disclose 
online, just 1% name medical information.94 
From the SMART project (2011-2014), it appears that the collection and sharing of sensitive personal 
data, such as health data, is unacceptable to the majority. However, under certain (especially life-saving) 
circumstances, the usage of confidential information is deemed acceptable. Moreover, it becomes ob-
vious that the level of acceptance is dependent on the type of technology. Technologies involving the 
physical sphere, e.g. biometrics, are perceived as especially unacceptable.95 
The empirical data from RESPECT in 2013-2014 show that the majority feel that they have little or no 
control over their personal information gathered with surveillance measures, and that there is a big risk 
of data misuse and misinterpretation.96 However, we must note that it was not clear in the question-
naire whether personal information included health information. 
3.1.3 SurPRISE – PRISMS – PACT 
Part of the SurPRISE project was the consultation of EU citizens via workshops and questionnaires, in 
order to find out their understanding and attitudes towards security and privacy. In 2014, when asked 
what the core of privacy is, participants of the workshops name sensitive data (e.g. health information, 
sexual orientation), which should not be intruded upon.97 
As for the data gathered by PRISMS in 2014, they show that regarding healthcare, there is a high concern 
about general socio-economic phenomena such as healthcare.98 Control over personal data (e.g. health) 
is in general of great importance.99 Part of the survey was the participants’ opinions about scenarios 
regarding specific security technologies. The first scenario about airport body scanners describes a per-
son whose colostomy bag is detected and who has to explain it to the security staff. The situation is 
perceived as difficult but acceptable given the security risks; while options for more privacy are dis-
cussed, a complete stop of detection is not considered due to security risks.100 In another scenario, a 
person receives a letter with doctors’ recommendations for flu vaccination based on the government 
monitoring of internet searches and communication. Hereby, many participants are concerned about 
government monitoring general internet usage.101 In a third scenario, a person voluntarily provides a 
                                                          
91 Ibid., p. 138f. 
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93 Ibid., p. 203. 
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95 ‘SMART: Report summary’, p. 9. 
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sample of his DNA to a company for medical research, but then learns that the company has been asked 
to share the samples with the police for use in criminal investigations. While DNA technologies are con-
sidered useful in solving crimes, the idea of sharing such sensitive data make the participants uncom-
fortable. Therefore, consent for sharing data with the police appears to be crucial; the option to sell this 
information for profit is widely seen as unacceptable. The uncertainty of what will happen with the 
information in the future and how the legislation might change plays an important role.102 
 
 
Figure 2: PACT health hypotheses testing103 
One of the PACT scenarios was the choice to purchase a device or service for storing health information 
(see also Fig. 2). In 2013, it becomes apparent that, in relation to other technologies such as CCTV, the 
storage of health data is mostly accepted. The majority of the respondents would prefer a device or 
service that allows, in addition to basic health data (e.g. blood group, allergies, diabetic status), storage 
of personal identification data and data on lifelong health conditions (e.g. asthma, disabilities, cancer), 
but they oppose to a storage of data relating to all other health conditions and medical history.104 The 
perceived trustworthiness of different authorities regarding access to health information is widely 
ranged, though: an additional access by paramedics is preferred, but not by fire and rescue personnel; 
the participants are adverse towards non-state actors (e.g. insurance providers, pharmaceutical com-
panies).105 With more concerns about personal information being accessed by non-medicals and private 
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companies, the preference of storage of medical data becomes weaker.106 The storage on a device 
should be accessible across the EU rather than merely in the respective home country – but not world-
wide.107 
 
3.2 Results from the Academic Literature 
Further research in academic literature was performed in two scientific databases with a defined key-
words list.108 The results revealed that most papers related to cybersecurity and health in a broader 
context do not contain empirical research about EU citizens’ attitudes and opinions (beyond the EU 
projects described above). They engage predominantly with (technical) details of applications, usability 
of their design and legal guidelines for them. Citizens’ concerns were mostly handled as a given fact, but 
without empirical basis. 
However, two topics emerged as relevant regarding cybersecurity and health, both of which deal with 
specific types of biological data and their electronic handling: biometrics and biobanks. 
3.2.1 Biometrics 
Biometric technologies for personal authentication can be in some aspects relevant for the health 
sphere. Two studies were found which surveyed the attitudes of EU citizens towards biometrics: the 
multilevel-multimethod approach of BioSec109 in which an attitude survey across Europe took place (204 
questionnaires in Finland, Germany, and Spain), and a study about regional differences in the perception 
of biometric authentication technologies110 (with 177 questionnaires in the UK).  
Although the use of biometric technologies is mostly accepted due to their benefits, e.g. as an authen-
tication method, there are also concerns due to the uncertainty for what exactly (else) the technology 
will be used for.111 Especially, the storage of biometrical data, which may include information about 
physiological condition and health, raises concerns: half of the respondents from the UK are not con-
vinced that their biometric information is stored in a secure way.112 The cross-European survey shows 
similar results: while there is no agreement regarding which storage medium is preferred for the data 
(a central database or a personal smart card), around 33% of the respondents cannot decide or do not 
want their biometrical data to be stored at all.113 
3.2.2 Biobanks 
As it already became apparent in ‘Special Eurobarometer 341’, the field of biobanks can be interesting 
for cybersecurity in health. Two pertinent studies could be found in academic research: a focus group 
study on biobanks in the information society114 (18 focus group discussions in Austria, Finland, and Ger-
many) and a multi-method approach about publics and biobanks115 (with focus groups in the Nether-
lands and Austria as well as 15,650 questionnaires in EU27 member states, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, and Turkey). Through first degree “snowballing”, three other relevant papers were de-
tected: a study of public opinion on the use of tissue samples116 with 100 questionnaires in the UK, a 
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population-based study about perceptions of potential donors in the Swedish public117 with 2,928 ques-
tionnaires, and a paper about attitudes towards biomedical use of tissue sample collections, consent, 
and biobanks among Finns118 with 1,195 questionnaires. 
The willingness to participate in biobanking by giving personal data through donation of e.g. blood, tis-
sues and body fluids (i.e. including DNA data) is relatively high.119 The respondents state a broad ac-
ceptance of usage especially for research due to the perceived societal benefits.120 However, the major-
ity would prefer to be informed and asked for consent for every specific use of their data, even though 
they are aware of the limited possibility to do so.121 They trust mostly in data security through public 
and state organisations, but not with private organisations.122 Not only commercialisation, but also in-
ternationalisation of biobanks (especially storage of data) is perceived as risky.123 The biggest concerns 
regarding biobanks are the future handling of sensitive data: the uncontrollability of future develop-
ments and therefore the possible usage of the stored data (e.g. for discrimination) is viewed very criti-
cally.124 
 
3.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
In the empirical studies found, it becomes apparent that the handling of health data plays an important 
role. Health data is considered as being an especially sensitive form of personal data. Health data in-
cludes every data that provides information about the health condition of a person. In a broader con-
text, it can also include biometrical and genetic data. 
The willingness to accept the recording, processing, and storing of health data is dependent on different 
factors. The transparency about the purposes of personal data and the way it is handled is perceived as 
crucial. The respondents in the aforementioned studies seem to agree to a certain extent on which 
authorities can be trusted in dealing with health data: health authorities, especially public institutions, 
are trustworthy – in contrast to commercial institutions (e.g. health insurance agencies, pharmaceutical 
companies) which generally are more expected to misuse data. The more databases and networks are 
connected internationally, the less they are accepted.  
Control over own privacy and data is stated important; nevertheless, the majority of respondents are 
aware of the benefits of electronic records of health information: not just security aspects, but also 
gained knowledge (e.g. for medical research) is highly appreciated. 
Most worries about potential risks regarding health data concern future developments about who is 
handling the currently stored data and for what purposes. This lack of confidence is widespread espe-
cially with regard to data that contains information about the identity of the data subject. 
In the empirical research about cybersecurity in health, it becomes apparent that there are only a few 
studies dealing with opinions and attitudes of EU citizens. Moreover, the few results that could be found 
appeared to be focused mostly on attitudes towards (health) data protection and privacy. Other aspects 
of cybersecurity in health seem merely to play a minor or even no role at all. 
                                                          
117 KETTIS-LINDBLAD et al., ‘Perceptions of potential donors in the Swedish public towards information and consent procedures 
in relation to use of human tissue samples in biobanks’.  
118 TUPASELA et al., ‘Attitudes towards biomedical use of tissue sample collections, consent, and biobanks among Finns’. 
119 GASKELL et al., op. cit., p. 15f. GOODSON and VERNON, op. cit., p. 136. TUPASELA et al., op. cit., p. 48. 
120 KETTIS-LINDBLAD et al., op. cit., p. 154. SNELL et al., op. cit., p. 299f. TUPASELA et al., op. cit., p. 154. 
121 GASKELL et al., op. cit., p. 16. GOODSON and VERNON, op. cit., p. 136. KETTIS-LINDBLAD et al., op. cit., p. 151f. SNELL et al., op. cit., 
p. 298f. TUPASELA et al., op. cit., p. 48f. 
122 GASKELL et al., op. cit., p. 16f. SNELL et al., op. cit., p. 298. TUPASELA et al., op. cit., p. 49. 
123 SNELL et al., op. cit., p. 298f, 301. 
124 GASKELL et al., op. cit., p. 17, 19. SNELL et al., op. cit., p. 300f. 
White Paper 3 – Attitudes & Opinions 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540   19
Considering the fact that electronic and digital approaches on health significantly gain importance, more 
empirical studies going beyond the topics of privacy and data protection would be necessary. 
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4. Citizens on cybersecurity in business 
In order to capture EU citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity in the business domain we have used a 
two-pronged approach. 1) We reviewed and collated empirical data from EU sources including EU cyber 
security strategy, Eurobarometer and the following EU projects: PRESCIENT, PRISMS, SurPRISE, and 
PRISE. 2) We did a systematic review of the academic literature.125 
Cybersecurity utilities are wide ranging so much so that they have been afforded elaborate definitions 
such as the following: “Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safe-
guards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and tech-
nologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment, organization and user’s assets.”126 We used 
this definition as a benchmark with the aim of capturing all relevant empirical data pertaining to EU 
citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity utilities from the period 1996 to 2016. 
 
4.1 Results from EU Reports and Projects127 
4.1.1 Cyber Security Strategy of the EU 
This document from 2013 states that in order for businesses and new connected technologies to take 
off, including e-payments, cloud computing or machine-to-machine communication, citizens will need 
to have trust in businesses and how they operate.128 However, this is not the case, as a 2012 Euroba-
rometer survey highlights that Europeans are not confident in their ability to use the internet for banking 
or purchases because of security concerns.129 Later surveys, however, indicate increasing awareness of 
cyber risks, and many are taking action to address these risks. However, there is still considerable vari-
ation in the proportions of respondents taking security measures, as highlighted while analysing the 
results of this survey at country level and by key socio-demographic groups, such as age and level of 
education (see Section 2.1.1). 
4.1.2 Eurobarometer 
Lack of trust in privately run businesses is affirmed in ‘Special Barometer 359’.130 In 2013, for example 
39% of participants included in this study trust shops and department stores; 32% trust phone compa-
nies, mobile phone companies and internet service providers; and 22% trust internet companies such 
as search engines, social networking sites and e-mail services.131 Surveillance and monitoring concerns 
via payment cards, mobile phones or on the internet were also raised, with seven in ten Europeans 
worried that private companies are using their personal information for a purpose other than originally 
intended (a process known as function creep), and without informing the citizen (e.g. for direct market-
ing or targeted online advertising).132 
While ‘Flash Eurobarometer 225’ reiterates similar concerns, it also highlights that citizens have the 
greatest levels of distrust in mail order companies.133 In 2008, 82% of internet users reason that data 
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transmission over the web is not sufficiently secure, with a third of respondents stressing that suspicious 
persons should be monitored (27%-35%) and one in five (14%-21%) would like stricter safeguards.134 
92% of Greek and Cypriot respondents who use the internet feel that their personal data is not suffi-
ciently secure, while very few believe that it is (6%).135 In contrast, 40% of Danish internet users feel 
transmitting data online is secure and respondents who express uncertainty about the efficiency of the 
security oriented technologies are male and from the younger age groups.136 
4.1.3 PRISE 
In relation to the potential privacy vs. autonomy conflict, the PRISE project found in 2007 that EU citizens 
weigh privacy higher than security, while 80% of them feel that it is unpleasant being under surveil-
lance.137 In relation to the threat of crime and terror, citizens are more accepting of security technology 
when the risk of crime is increased.138 In respect of security technology, participants are concerned with 
its effectiveness and that there is potential for misuse by criminals, commercial interest and govern-
mental institutions.139 Identifiable information and access are again raised as concerns by EU citizens.140 
They feel that new security tools should be subjected to public scrutiny before implementation.141  
PRISE concludes that 1) “physically intimate technologies are unacceptable, misuse of technology must 
be prevented and function creep is not acceptable” and 2) security technologies are more acceptable 
when there is proportionality between security gain and privacy loss, when security is under strict con-
trol (to prevent misuse by the people with access to data) and when privacy infringing security technol-
ogies are the last option (previous methods must be measured and found less effective prior to imple-
menting privacy infringing technologies).142  
4.1.4 PRESCIENT  
In relation to security technologies, the PRESCIENT project found in 2012 that new technologies are not 
understood by the general public and access to new security technology and its uses is invisible to the 
average citizen – therein is where cybersecurity risks manifest.143 It revealed that EU citizens have a 
variety of concerns relating to cybersecurity in business but interestingly, some EU citizens are more 
concerned than others. For example, data collection, data security, unauthorised or inappropriate use 
of data, and illegitimate disclosure of intelligence data are issues raised by citizens from Cyprus, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Slovakia. Concerns relating to the disclosure of information on the internet or to 
third parties regarding the public facility services are raised by Swedish and Latvian citizens. Employer-
employee relationships, human resources, monitoring or surveillance of employees in the workplace 
and employees right to privacy and data protection in the workplace are issues raised by citizens from 
Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, whereas the financial sector in general and the leakage 
of financial data are raised by Danes and Slovaks. Belgians and Slovenians are concerned with spam and 
viral marketing and direct marketing and Germans are also concerned with non-public sector and tele-
communications. Slovaks too are concerned with the use of loyalty cards and the legitimate use of bio-
metric data, while Danes and Slovenians also have concerns regarding the use of social networking 
sites.144 We note that in the United Kingdom between 2007 and 2011 citizens’ trust in online companies 
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decreased by 8% and trust that organisational practices provide sufficient protection of personal infor-
mation decreased by 5%.145 
4.1.5 SurPRISE  
This project looked at surveillance-oriented security technologies (SOST) including smart CCTV, 
smartphone location tracking and deep packet inspection (DPI).146 DPI is the most relevant SOST as 1) it 
is used in cybersecurity as a packaging filter through which information is scanned for non-compliance, 
virus, etc.; and 2) it can be used by businesses for internet data mining (the process of collecting and 
using large sets of data for actions such as choosing the best customers for targeted mailings or analys-
ing a shopping cart), eavesdropping and internet censorship.147 According to SurPRISE data from 2014, 
citizens suggest SOSTs should be evaluated before implementation, clarifying their purpose, appropri-
ateness, cost and their potential impact.148 Participants would like verification on what data is being 
collected, who is responsible for such data, and for what purpose is the data being collected.149 SOSTs 
are considered as useful but highly intrusive and interestingly DPI is perceived as most intrusive.150 43% 
of EU citizens who participated in this study state that DPI is an effective security tool and 66% feel 
uncomfortable with its use.151 84% are worried about the extension and future use of DPI with 70% 
believing that SOSTs are likely to be abused.152 70% are concerned about extensive information collec-
tions, 63% fear that information held about them might be inaccurate, near to 80% fear that their per-
sonal information might be used against them and 91% are concerned that their information is shared 
without their permission.153 50% of participants disagree with the statement “if you have done nothing 
wrong you do not have to worry about surveillance-oriented security technologies” with only 34% 
agreeing with this statement.154 52% of the “nothing to hide” supporters are at the same time con-
cerned that too much information is collected about them, which is contradictory.155 
4.1.6 PRISMS  
The PRISMS project found in 2014 that 62% of respondents to the survey think that it is important to be 
able to use the internet freely and anonymously, and 81% state that it is important that they know who 
has information about them.156 It also reaffirms that – as seen in ‘Special Barometer 359’ – citizens dis-
tinguish between security technologies and practices operated by public and private sector institutions. 
Citizens have more trust that public authorities will respect their right to privacy and data protection 
when compared to profit-oriented companies; they oppose covert surveillance practices and the sec-
ondary use of data, especially for commercial purposes; there is a high level of resistance to private 
sector actors who collect and process personal data.157 
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4.2 Results from the Academic Literature 
The number of empirical studies we found that directly address attitudes and opinions of citizens re-
garding cybersecurity in the business domain is surprisingly low. Almost 20 years ago, a small UK study 
conducted in 1999 focused on the general public’s attitudes towards security in an e-commerce envi-
ronment.158 58% of participants say they have not purchased online, of whom 51% say that this was due 
to insecure communications and 43% say it was due to untrustworthiness of the vendor. 61% are con-
cerned with communications security and 55% worry about the use of personal information by the ven-
dor. 52% mention concerns over vendor authentication and credibility and 33% are concerned with the 
vendor’s vulnerable internal network.159 Regarding different security safeguards for e-commerce, only 
55% attempt this question with an awareness of the following security technologies: data encryption 
standard (80%); digital/electronic signature 64%; certification authority (50%), secure electronic trans-
action (42%) and trusted third party (33%).  
Although the digital ecosystem has grown considerably since then, the attitudes did not seem to have 
changed considerably. A more recent study conducted in 2012 in Slovenia gives an illustrative snapshot 
of how Slovenian citizens view certain cyber processes in terms of safety.160 Out of 277 participants 
surveyed, 104 view business data exchange (undefined in the study) as unsafe, 199 view online banking 
as unsafe, 190 view online shopping as unsafe, and 216 view internet data exchange as unsafe.161  
 
4.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
The review of EU publications and academic literature reveals that there is little empirical data that in 
any way significantly relates to EU citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity in the business domain. In-
terestingly, EU citizens’ attitudes towards cybersecurity in business depends on the type of business and 
whether that business can be trusted to appropriately use the personal data it collects. Using cyberse-
curity measures that collect and process personal information, such as DPI, perpetuates the privacy 
infringement concerns. EU citizens are concerned that private businesses will misuse personal infor-
mation gathered via security technologies for commercial purposes without the consent of the individ-
ual, or that information will be used against them. Access, social networking sites and communications 
security (in particular internet and e-commerce security) are reoccurring concerns. The trust issue 
seems to be in congruence with three factors: the institution, be it private or public; the technology; 
and the person who has access to the security technology or data retrieved. 
It would be interesting to study whether the high level of resistance to trusting private businesses with 
personal information may stem from EU citizens’ limited awareness of cybersecurity technologies and 
their functions. In order to get a better understanding of how EU citizens view cybersecurity in business, 
further empirical research is required.  
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5. Citizens on cybersecurity in police and 
national security 
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of existing empirical data regarding attitudes and opin-
ions of (mainly) European citizens about cyber-related matters of public and national security, we have 
examined the synthesis papers of the EU projects PRESCIENT, PRISMS, PRISE, and SurPRISE.162 
 
5.1 Attitudes towards Privacy 
A consensus between European citizens exists that security and privacy are important factors. This is 
shown by PRISMS in 2014 where 87% of the participants agree upon that “protecting my privacy is very 
important or important” as well as “taking action against important security risks is very important or 
important”. An even higher consensus is shown (92%) that “defending civil liberties and human rights is 
very important or important”.163 PRISMS takes this as a first indication that people do not want a trade-
off between security and privacy. “This is a first indication for a shared commitment to privacy and 
security, against a trade-off.”164 
 
 
Figure 3: Europeans' views on greatest challenges to national security in 2011 165 
This finding, however, is in some tension to the general relevance of cybercrime and other risks directly 
related to cybersecurity: economic crisis, terrorism and poverty are still considerably higher ranked (see 
Fig. 3). 
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While people do not seem to like the privacy vs. security trade-off situation, it is hard to deny that this 
trade-off is often present when it comes to concrete measures. In 2015, SurPRISE further discussed the 
often-cited assumption that the gain of additional security leads to a loss of privacy. “The trade-off 
model is based on the assumption that the employment of security measures requires privacy intrusion 
in order to come to a certain level of security. This logic inherently operates as if privacy intrusions would 
be the only and inevitable option to effectively improve security.”166 
In order to minimize the trade-off in the case of conflicting security and privacy goals, it is important 
that a good knowledge of the involved technologies and their effectiveness exists. 
One of the key findings of PRESCIENT in 2012 has been the fact that citizens often lack understanding 
of the techniques involved in security measures, especially of security measures deployed on a large 
scale by state actors such as biometrics. “Thus the consequences of each technology are not necessarily 
easily comprehensible, or even directly relatable to that technology.”167 
We must therefore conclude that it is not sufficient to define values: adequate and unbiased infor-
mation need to be supplied, not only to the decision makers but to the citizens as well. For all techni-
cally-savvy people it is important to take this into account when implementing value-sensitive technol-
ogies. This is not only relevant for state actors but for the private sector as well. It is not sufficient for a 
security company to say “we adhere to the respective local laws” but it should instead relate to a com-
mon set of values for the development and operations of their technology. 
The fact that the private sector is a player in this domain as well is reflected by one finding of SurPRISE 
in 2014, namely the reluctance of many persons against the involvement of the private sector in the 
domain of surveillance.168 “Acceptable SOSTs [Surveillance-Oriented Security Technologies] are technol-
ogies operated only by public authorities for the sake of the public interest. The participation of private 
actors in security operations should be limited and strictly regulated.”169 
One of the most often cited attitudes towards privacy is “those who have nothing to hide have nothing 
to fear”, a statement that falsely reduces privacy to a form of secrecy aiming at hiding things.170 
The authors of PRISE state another interesting fact that the public expects the policy makers to foster a 
discussion about new technologies before they are introduced, and to state clear limits on the technol-
ogies in order to prevent a function creep. This discussion should be as broad as possible.171 In 2007, 
the study found a certain ambiguity towards the role of the state and the use of PETs (Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies). “When it was pointed out that some technologies could prevent investigation of specific 
crimes such as distribution of child pornography, they gained even less acceptance.”172 
Another important factor described by PRISE was the fact that the public only accepts security measures 
if they are perceived as effective. This is also valid for all privacy measures. PRISE concludes and recom-
mends a dynamic and regularly reassessed approach when it comes to security and privacy measures: 
“The implementation of security technologies and legal regulations must therefore be reassessed reg-
ularly and precautions for the required flexibility to permit the withdrawal of inefficient and infringing 
measures and technologies should be taken.”173 
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5.2 Country-specific Attitudes 
In 2014, SurPRISE asked survey participants how strong they agree with the “nothing to hide” statement. 
50% of all participants strongly disagree or disagree with this statement. There is a certain contradiction 
in the case of Hungary, where only 18% strongly disagreed or disagreed with this statement but where 
there is a bigger amount of distrust towards its public servants. In the case of Germany, however, these 
two statements are aligned as Germany disagrees the most strongly with the “nothing to hide” state-
ment (78%). On the other hand, 70% of all participants in SurPRISE share the concern that too much 
information is collected about a person.174 
These findings have a strong impact on how citizens see the state as an actor in this domain and may 
eventually lead towards two basic areas of perception: 
 Citizens see the state as a guardian that must protect them against violations of their privacy. 
 Citizens see the state as an actor that endangers their privacy. 
Which of these two opposites dominates in a society depends on the history and background of a coun-
try or society. In 2012, PRESCIENT examined this question based on interviews in 6 European countries 
(Spain, Hungary, Norway, Germany, Denmark, and Austria). The countries that had confrontations be-
tween the state and its citizens (or a part of its citizens) seem to generally have a greater mistrust to-
wards public servants and their use of security technology. On the other hand, the two Scandinavian 
countries seem to have a higher trust in their institutions.  
PRISE stated as well that there are significant differences between nations and their general perception 
of the state and their trust towards institutions and public servants.175 In this context, PRISE docu-
mented the statement by Norwegian participants in 2007 that directly emphasizes the need for defining 
and adhering to values: “This is not only something to understand, this is about values.”176 
The question about the involvement of the public and the decision-making has been discussed as well 
in the PRISE project. There is a common understanding that a public decision is crucial for the ac-
ceptance of surveillance technology or more generally privacy-related projects. The question “Who 
should decide?” is more difficult to answer. Even if – according to PRISE – some countries (Germany and 
Denmark) would leave the decision to politicians, this should not be taken as a general statement. We 
believe that this is influenced by the political system (representative democracy vs. direct democracy), 
as e.g. Switzerland as a direct democracy had several referendums dealing with questions about security 
and privacy. 
Various popular votes that took place in Switzerland provide very interesting and relevant insights on 
the citizens’ attitudes. As opposed to pure surveys, popular votes have legal and societal consequences. 
One vote concerned the referendum on the introduction of the biometric passport.177 When the Swiss 
Federal Council decided to introduce a new passport with biometric elements that are to be stored 
centrally, the referendum had been taken by various organizations. One of the main concerns of privacy-
oriented organizations was the fact that the biometric elements were to be stored in a central database. 
The topic turned out to be controversial, and the supporters won with a very small margin (50.1% voted 
yes, 49.9% no).178 
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Another vote concerned the increases of the electronic surveillance capabilities (e.g., internet and email 
monitoring, offensive capabilities using Trojans) of Swiss security services.179 The proposed vote won a 
support of 66% of the voting population. This is a strong indicator that the benefits of surveillance are 
perceived to outweigh the associated privacy risks. This conclusion is in line with observations made by 
Giles and Hartmann: 
“Although disclosure of the alleged capability and reach of U.S. and allied surveillance mechanisms 
prompted strident and outraged reportage in some sections of the English-language media, public 
opinion has not followed suit. Instead, a more balanced and sober assessment of national security 
needs is leading European states to pass legislation through due democratic process to ensure 
that internet monitoring of speciﬁc threats to security continues unhindered. It follows that active 
cyber defence in the sense of active measures online in order to prevent and pre-empt threats to 
national security will continue to be perceived as legitimate, and these measures should be ex-
pected to continue unrestrained by the new environment of enhanced public awareness.”180 
 
5.3 Attitudes towards Technologies 
The SurPRISE project tried, amongst others, to measure the perception of the intrusiveness vs. the ef-
fectiveness of so-called surveillance-oriented security technology (SOST). In 2014, SurPRISE analysed 
the following SOSTs: smart CCTV, deep packet inspection (DPI) and smartphone location tracking (SLT). 
One interesting finding is that there is a relation in the perception of a technology between its effec-
tiveness and its intrusiveness: “Despite of the differences in particular, the effectiveness and intrusive-
ness of the SOSTs are interrelated: those technologies perceived as highly intrusive are also perceived 
as less effective.”181 (see Table below). 
 
Technology Considered an effective na-
tional security tool (*)  
Considered an appropriate 
way to address national secu-
rity threats (*) 
Feeling uncomfortable with 
the use of the technology 
smart CCTV 64% 51% 39% 
DPI 43% about 40% 45% 
SLT 55% about 40% 66% 
(*) % of participants strongly agreeing or agreeing that it is an effective technology.182 
 
This is a very interesting finding as, from a technical point of view, DPI was considered as being ineffec-
tive for national security compared to SLT and smart CCTV. 
When we consider the findings of PRESCIENT and PRISE, a certain part of these findings might be related 
to the fact that DPI is one of the most complex technologies with a high risk of function creep. However, 
DPI might be one of the most interesting technologies against certain threats to national security but it 
is most likely one of the most privacy intruding. 
If a state actor decides to do DPI, widely used cryptography is something that hinders this approach. It 
is interesting to note that none of the examined papers seems to focus on the role of the state when it 
comes to cryptography (“cryptowars”, where states try to enable a decryption of communication or 
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data by legal measures). The weakening of cryptography would likely have much stronger security and 
privacy consequences than most of the other invasive technologies. 
We believe that not only technologies actively used by actors might endanger some core values but as 
well the fact that states try to weaken techniques for their own purposes. As von Liechtenstein already 
pointed out in 2002, this may have a major change in the balance between states and citizens: “The 
potential of cryptography to reorder citizen/government power relationships is already attracting the 
close attention of National Governments.”183 
It is important that the public discussion does not only focus on the use of SOST but also on which PETs 
are available to what extent and if the state does not try to circumvent, ban or weaken such technologies 
for the broad public for the sake of SOSTs. 
One of the most interesting research questions of SurPRISE was about the criteria that should be 
adopted when introducing new SOSTs. We are going to focus on the most important factors that seem 
to have a direct relation to potential values that should be considered by state actors. According to 
SurPRISE participants in 2014, “SOSTs are more acceptable if implemented in a context where infor-
mation is provided to citizens on: a) where SOSTs are used, b) how SOSTs function, c) for what purpose 
they have been installed and d) who is in charge of managing the system.”184 
For us, this leads to one of the most important concepts in any democratic state: trust. Trust is some-
thing that can only be gained if all participants adhere to a common set of values. This is also proved by 
a finding of SurPRISE where the relationship between trust and trustworthiness is being shown:  
 
Technology Security authorities are trustworthy when us-
ing the technology (*) 
Security authorities do not abuse their 
power (*) 
smart CCTV 36% 22% 
DPI 36% 14% 
SLT 46% 29% 
(*) % of participants strongly agreeing or agreeing that it is an effective technology.185 
 
These values could also be interpreted in a way that the trust is going to be lost quickly if abuse of a 
technology by a state actor comes to public. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
We have seen that citizens of different countries or with different cultural background differ in their 
perception of the role of the state and of value-sensitive technologies (e.g., the application of SOSTs). 
Trustworthiness and transparency of a state seem to be important factors influencing this perception. 
As SurPRISE clearly points out, it is not only about how safe a technology is, but also how safe is the 
context in which the technology is used. If citizens see the state more as a guardian of their privacy and 
security and less as an intruder, they are more likely to accept security measures; this perception is 
closely related to how much citizens trust their state representatives based on their experience and the 
history of their society. 
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As Swiss experts in the field, we suggest that, for many technologies, there is an inherent security vs. 
privacy trade-off, in some cases more pronounced than in others. For instance, in the case of the weak-
ening of cryptography, this trade-off manifests itself strongly. We believe that it is not acceptable to put 
the privacy of a whole society in danger for the sake of a simpler prosecution of criminals; yet it is un-
disputed that criminals participating in serious crimes have a limited right to privacy. 
There are also security measures where the trade-off is less accentuated, but nevertheless subtle. For 
instance, consider the collection and analysis of metadata for the discovery of malware flows. On the 
one hand, the metadata collection has adverse effects on privacy. On the other hand, the detection of 
infected devices helps restoring the privacy of affected users. We believe that if in this example 
metadata collection would be forbidden out of, loosely speaking, “naïve privacy concerns”, the net ef-
fect on privacy would be negative: the damage to privacy caused by undetected malware would be 
greater than the (forbidden) privacy invasion due to cybersecurity software. 
In summary, we believe that it is crucial to gain and maintain a holistic, value-based view on all topics 
and to avoid isolated views on singular problem blocks. A pronounced “privacy first” or “security first” 
attitude is unlikely to produce beneficial solutions for society. Finding good solutions and trade-offs is a 
laborious and ongoing process, which requires to assess a multitude of technologies and application 
scenarios with respect to their effect on the core values of a society.  
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6. State actors’ cybersecurity strategies 
Cybersecurity is an issue acknowledged widely across Europe and globally. The increasing digitalization 
permeates the everyday lives of citizens as well as the overall environment in which industry and gov-
ernments operate. Notably, the NATO countries published in July 2016 a ‘Cyber Defence Pledge’, which 
recognizes security threats and reaffirms the support and enhancement of the cyber defences of their 
national infrastructures and networks.186 
This section gives an overview on the correlating cybersecurity opinions and presents various state ac-
tors strategies to address cybersecurity. State actors are understood here as official governmental in-
stitutions at EU and EU member state levels. Furthermore, solution approaches for cybersecurity issues 
are examined, which not only address the security perspective, but also integrate the data protection 
perspective. As for the research methodology, only little insight could be drawn from literature and 
studies. Therefore, our sources consist mostly of legislation, policy documents, official statements and 
other information directly coming from the above-mentioned state actors. 
 
6.1 Cybersecurity Strategies at the EU Level 
Cybersecurity threats are a global issue, a fact that was recognized by the EU and its individual institu-
tions relatively early. Furthermore, it was recognized that this issue can only be dealt with global re-
sponses, necessitating international communication, harmonized legislation and effort coming from 
both the public and private sectors. Nonetheless, cybersecurity matters have a quite complex nature, 
making a unified approach sometimes difficult. Working towards resolving this difficulty, the European 
Commission issued a communication addressing Europe’s transition to an information society already 
in 2001. This communication referenced a number of already existing approaches and proposed some 
further action items in order to protect information and communication infrastructures. It called for a 
comprehensive policy initiative, a unified definition of cybercrime, more in-depth communication with 
different stakeholders, and more R&D funding to address such threats. For these goals, the Commission 
pledged to establish an EU Forum to involve law enforcement agencies, internet service providers, tel-
ecommunications operators, civil liberties organizations, consumer representatives, data protection au-
thorities, and other interested parties.187 The Article 29 Working Party188 issued an opinion on this com-
munication, welcoming the Commission’s stance on this topic, yet asking how individuals’ basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms will be taken into account when adopting measures to combat computer-
related crime so that all legitimate interests can be accommodated in the best way possible.189 
With the drafting of its ‘Cyber Security Strategy’ in 2013, the EU further detailed its position regarding 
cooperation and communication related to cybersecurity matters. Thereby, the Commission committed 
itself to launching a public-private platform on network and information security (NIS) solutions, in order 
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to develop incentives for the adoption of secure ICT solutions and for the increase of cybersecurity per-
formance of ICT products used in Europe. This strategy entails further action points to achieve technical 
guidelines, recommendations, industry standards and general information exchange to enhance cyber-
security, also involving ENISA as well as public and private stakeholders.190 
More concrete legislative actions followed, such as Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification of Eu-
ropean critical infrastructures, or the directive on the security of network and information systems (‘NIS 
Directive’). While the former is aimed at critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP), the latter 
foresees rules, preconditions, and measures meant to ensure a high common level of NIS across the 
Union.191 Furthermore, the European Commission encouraged the EU member states to make the most 
of the NIS coordination mechanisms enabled by this legislative act.192 The European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) Peter Hustinx commented both the new ‘Cyber Security Strategy’ and the ‘NIS Di-
rective’ in an opinion highlighting that a high level of internet security will improve the security of per-
sonal information as well.193 Nonetheless, the EDPS pointed out that there is a threat of cybersecurity 
measures interfering with individuals’ rights to privacy and the protection of their personal data. He 
called for ensuring that every cybersecurity measure deployed complies with article 52(1) of the ‘Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. Thus, all relevant fundamental rights should be taken 
into account in the EU’s ‘Cyber Security Strategy’, which includes all its implementing actions.194 In 2015, 
the following EDPS in office, Giovanni Buttarelli, further emphasized this demand in a follow-up opinion 
on the topic of national security in 2015.195 By that time, the EU has also acknowledged that the protec-
tion of individuals’ personal information needs to be improved. This is a major reason why the EU trig-
gered its reform process for its data protection framework, while a new regulation on privacy and elec-
tronic communications is still underway.196 
Beyond the ‘Cyber Security Strategy’ and the ‘NIS Directive’, the Commission launched a new public-
private partnership on cybersecurity with industry to better equip Europe against cyber-attacks and to 
strengthen the competitiveness of its cybersecurity sector. This action was triggered by various motiva-
tions, such as economic considerations (see e.g. the Commission’s ‘Digital Single Market Strategy’197) or 
the recognition of cybersecurity threats as becoming increasingly significant in the everyday lives of EU 
citizens. Such recognition may have been expedited by surveys showing this development quite clearly. 
For instance, the ‘Global State of Information Security® Survey’, executed by PwC, found that more than 
80% of European companies have experienced at least one cybersecurity incident over the last year and 
that the number of security incidents across all industries worldwide rose by 38% in 2015.198 The key 
findings in this survey strongly demand for actions based on this situation, such as: 
- Adopting new safeguards for digital business models 
- Implementing business-critical threat intelligence and information-sharing programs 
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- Securing the potential of the internet of things (IoT) 
- Taking a proactive approach to managing geopolitical threats. 
Based on its evaluation outcome, ENISA, founded in 2004, will probably achieve a further mandate to 
play a crucial role in realizing such actions, mainly by providing information and guidance, e.g. on cyber 
crisis management.199  Alongside the European Commission and ENISA, the Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY) of the Council of Europe200 represents the state parties to the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime. The consultation of the T-CY aims at facilitating the effective use and implementation of 
the Convention, the exchange of information and the consideration of any future amendments. The T-
CY has published a number of different assessments and reports on cybercrime.201 All these institutions 
at the European level aim at achieving comprehensive and harmonized governance of cybersecurity-
related issues, where efforts are undertaken in various areas, such as policy/legislation, finances, and 
operational measures. Yet, those institutions still struggle with divisive factors on national, pan-Euro-
pean, and extra-European/transatlantic level, mostly caused by diverging willingness of the EU member 
states to commit resources, lack of clarity regarding the understanding of cybersecurity and cybercrime, 
and partially significant disparities in governance strategies and focus. 
 
6.2 Cybersecurity Strategies at the National Level 
At national level, the EU member states have developed their own cybersecurity strategies, whose goals 
correlate with those of the EU strategy, with varying detail and focus on specific aspects. For example, 
Luxembourg’s cybersecurity strategy foresees a number of important objectives for the country, plus 
an additional action plan naming in detail the responsible authorities, as well as the anticipated time 
frame for realisation. These objectives include strengthening national cooperation (also with the aca-
demic and research sphere), increasing the resilience of digital infrastructures, the determination of 
measures to fight cybercrime, the implementation of norms, standards certificates, labels and frames 
of references for government and critical infrastructure requirements. Furthermore, this strategy rec-
ommends and calls for the information, training, and awareness of cyber risks.202 
As another example of a larger country, France’s cybersecurity strategy focuses on specific details in 
some areas, such as increasing the security of state information systems (including the development of 
cybersecurity requirements for public contracting and support), providing local assistance to victims of 
cyber-malevolent acts, measuring cybercrime, and protecting the digital lives, privacy, and personal 
data of French citizens. Moreover, France’s approach to eliminate and mitigate cybersecurity threats 
includes operational mechanisms for international administrative assistance and educational measures, 
the support of security services and products, and knowledge transfer including the education of the 
general public. However, for the individual objectives mentioned, the French strategy does not provide 
action items as detailed as the Luxembourg one.203 
As already mentioned, it proves difficult that many countries still have different understandings of the 
meaning and scope of both cybersecurity and cybercrime, if they have such a tangible understanding at 
all. For instance, Spain has a rather strong focus on the country’s capability to investigate and prosecute 
cyber terrorism and cybercrime, yet its cybersecurity strategy does not specify which kind of acts are 
                                                          
199 See e.g. their overview of recommended publications on that matter: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyber-crisis-management?tab=publications.  
200 The Council of Europe (CoE) is not an official EU body, but a human rights organisation that was established in 1949 after 
World War II. It now comprises of 47 member states, 28 of which belong to the European Union.  
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are  
201 https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/tcy 
202 ‘National Cybersecurity Strategy II’, Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, p. 23ff. 
203 ‘French National Digital Security Strategy’, 2015, République française, p. 15, 21ff, 26f, 31ff. 
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considered a cybercrime.204 As for Croatia’s cybersecurity strategy, it provides a definition of cyber-
crime, yet this definition is rather broad and vague.205 Thus, there are large differences in the level of 
detail and commitment made in those national cybersecurity strategies, which will probably take some 
time and additional pan-European communication as well as harmonization effort for remedy. 
Most EU member states have established institutions dedicated to cybersecurity issues such as, for ex-
ample, the German BSI (Federal Office for Information Security). This institution is tasked with investi-
gating current IT security risks and creates yearly situation reports of the IT security landscape in Ger-
many. It also functions as a cyber defence centre and reporting office for security incidents. Together 
with another institution, the BBK (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance), the BSI 
provides an internet platform for the protection of critical infrastructures.206 The German operators of 
critical infrastructures in the sectors of energy, information technology and telecommunications, water 
and nutrition, are required to report security incidents to the BSI and to demonstrate legal compliance 
every two years, by providing a detailed protection concept corresponding with the state of the art.207 
Other operators (not active in the aforementioned sectors) can make such reports on a voluntary basis. 
Beside institutions like the BSI, many EU countries have expert groups focusing on security incidents, 
which are organised in computer emergency response teams (CERTs), sometimes also called computer 
emergency readiness teams or computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs). They are cross-
linked globally and across the EU, offering warnings and problem resolution on security issues, especially 
involving product security teams from the government, commercial, and academic sectors.208 
National data protection authorities (DPAs) are concerned with cybersecurity issues, too. Article 17 of 
the current Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC states that “the controller must implement […] 
measures to […] ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and 
the nature of the data to be protected”. This level of security must be reached through the implemen-
tation of necessary and suitable technical and organisational measures to protect the personal infor-
mation of individuals, which will also enhance cybersecurity in general. National data protection laws 
implement the minimum requirements of this directive in each member state. Moreover, some EU 
countries felt the need to exceed the requirements of this directive to ensure an adequate protection 
of their IT landscape. An example of this could be the French Digital Republic Act (Law n°2016-1321 of 
7 October 2016). This Act introduces several key amendments beyond the French Data Protection Act 
of 1978 and other laws, allowing for even stricter rules to protect citizens, e.g. through specific obliga-
tions for online platform providers. 
With the reform of the European data protection framework, the focus on the security of information 
technology systems will even deepen. For the private sector, the applicable legal framework is the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation209 (GDPR), coming into force in May 2018. The GDPR requires the im-
plementation of technical and organisational measures necessary and suitable to protect the personal 
information of individuals. This includes appropriate security measures210 and the ability to demonstrate 
compliance with the legal framework.211 Furthermore, under certain circumstances the responsible con-
troller has to conduct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA, see below). 
                                                          
204 Cf. ‘National Cyber Security Strategy’, 2013, Gobierno de España, p. 11, 29. 
205 Cf. ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’, p. 16. 
206 See the information website of the BSI: 
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/TheBSI/Functions/functions_node.html.  
207 Article 8a Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Gesetz or BSIG). 
208 See the information website of the global CERT association platform FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams): https://www.first.org/about. 
209 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679’. 
210 Cf. articles 4 (5), 5 (e) + (f) GDPR.  
211 See e.g. articles 24 (1), 25 (1) + (2), 28 (1) + (3) (e), 30 (1) (g) + (2) (d), 32 (1) GDPR. 
White Paper 3 – Attitudes & Opinions 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540   34
Against this background, the national DPAs publish their own statements and opinions on cybersecurity 
issues to bring in their perspective. In 2015, the French CNIL212 published an analysis of personal data 
protection in the context of cybersecurity. It found that privacy is a crucial aspect in the digital era and 
that a more holistic approach to both cybersecurity and privacy is sorely needed, while baseline security 
rules are not yet sufficiently established.213 In 2013, the Italian DPA214 published guidelines for busi-
nesses including recommendations on how to protect their data and the data of their customers and 
employees.215 The Information Commissioner of the United Kingdom (ICO UK) also focuses on infor-
mation security, informing on his website about the relevant technical and organisational measures re-
quired by the national and EU data protection frameworks.216 Moreover, the ICO UK regularly publishes 
current data security incident trends, covering various issues relating to information security in the 
cyber domain.217 
 
6.3 Solution Approaches 
In the sequel, we consider solution approaches proposed and acted upon by state actors at EU and 
national levels. These solution approaches very often define and/or explain specific working strategies 
and priorities of state actors. Thereby, they usually make the transfer from theoretical knowledge and 
statements of state actors to concrete operational or policy-framed legislative actions. We especially 
focus here on the privacy and data protection perspective, since this domain is increasingly seen as very 
important to complement the classic security perspective.  
With the rise of the digital era and the continuous development of technology, some high-level obser-
vations can be made. For instance, the increase of interconnectedness also means an increase of in-
volved actors and recipients of data, i.e. ever greater networks of entities. More data also leads to more 
possibilities of analysis with big data tools, thus scaling up risks of re-identification of individuals, profil-
ing and disrupted power balances. Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that cybersecurity risks 
do not only come from the outside, but malicious insiders may cause significant damage as well.218 In 
addition, companies as well as governments may be inclined to accept greater risks due to economic or 
political motivations. Such a stance can lead to the exposure of whole infrastructures to cybersecurity 
threats. Precisely for these reasons, it is important first not to underestimate cybersecurity risks, then 
to undertake the necessary measures, and finally to establish the auditability of compliance.  
Many institutions within the EU, at both national and European levels, recommend taking initial steps 
for IT systems and networks with the definition of processes, the close monitoring of their execution, 
supplemented by preventive and reactive measures compliant with the state of the art.219 This includes 
the consideration of information security best practices and standards, such as ISO, COBIT, or ITIL. From 
a data protection perspective, the above-mentioned technical and organisational measures often cor-
relate and their implementation should be much more prevalent in many areas and sectors. Equally 
                                                          
212 Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (National Commission on Informatics and Liberties). 
213 Cf. the CNIL’s ‘36th Activity Report 2015’, p. 14ff. 
214 Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (Guarantor for the Protection of Personal Data). 
215 ‘Privacy: working with business – Ten corporate best practices to improve your business’. 
216 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/principle-7-security/  
217 Such as cryptographic flaws (e.g. failure to use HTTPS), exfiltration of data, key-logging software, phishing, cyber security 
misconfiguration (e.g. inadvertent publishing of data on website), loss/theft of an only copy of encrypted data or the 
loss/theft of an unencrypted device, diverse DDoS and others. These examples come from the July-September 2016 period: 
https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-trends/.  
218 Cf. the assessment with study references in ‘ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016’, p. 46ff. 
219 This is also reflected in the private sector, reacting to the governmental encouragement. See e.g. the recommendations of 
the industry-driven European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) in its ‘European Cybersecurity Strategic Research and Inno-
vation Agenda (SRIA) for a contractual Public-Private-Partnership (cPPP)’, p. 26ff. 
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essential are data protection by design and by default efforts, including a DPIA before any IT system 
deployment.220 For the DPIA, many national DPAs in the EU have developed different approaches.221 
Yet, some of these approaches have shortcomings with regard to the protection of the fundamental 
rights of individuals by reducing the assessment to a mere risk-based approach. However, this viewpoint 
does not sufficiently represent both data protection issues and cybersecurity matters. 
In Germany, all national data protection supervisory authorities have acknowledged a unified approach 
named Standard Data Protection Model, which has a strong fundamental rights underpinning.222 It is 
based on protection goals which can be derived directly from the applicable data protection framework. 
This protection goal based approach provides a more tangible concept to identify and implement 
measures needed to protect information related to individuals, while those measures are also useful to 
enhance cybersecurity. According to article 35(7) GDPR, the DPIA is required to provide at least: 
“(a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the pro-
cessing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller;  
(b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to 
the purposes;  
(c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in para-
graph 1; and  
(d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and 
mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this 
Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other per-
sons concerned.” 
Such an assessment requires the responsible entity to take into account the whole processing lifecycle, 
including all data, formats, IT systems, processes and functions. 
 
Figure 4: A comparison of data security and data protection 
In the IT security domain, the processing lifecycle is usually looked at from a risks assessment standpoint, 
while some classic protection goals are taken into account as well (see also Fig. 4). This approach is 
called the classic CIA triad (for the protection goals confidentiality, integrity, and availability) and is com-
monly used by IT security experts to conduct assessments. However, these protection goals do not cover 
all data protection requirements, since the classic IT security perspective is driven by the desire of the 
controller to protect business data and assets. Data protection, however, goes further than that, due to 
                                                          
220 As already demanded at the EU level by the EDPS in its action plan in ‘The EDPS Strategy 2015-2019’, p. 17ff. 
221 See e.g. the ICO UK or the French CNIL (methodology handbook): 
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/it-security-top-tips/ 
https://www.cnil.fr/en/privacy-impact-assessments-cnil-publishes-its-pia-manual. 
222 ‘The Standard Data Protection Model’, German Data Protection Authorities. 
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its fundamental rights status, primarily considering the perspective of the individual (the data subject). 
Therefore, the classic IT security approach needs to be extended to a more holistic viewpoint, striving 
for tangible operational measures that protect not only business models, but also the fundamental 
rights of individuals in relation to privacy and data protection. 
To close this gap and help with the translation of complex legal requirements into functional require-
ments, an extension of the original methodology has been made in the above-mentioned Standard Data 
Protection Model.223 Originally developed in Germany224, it provides a methodology which is directly 
based on the GDPR and is thus useable all across the EU. Briefly summarized (see also Fig. 5), three 
additional data protection goals supplement the IT security focused ones, namely: unlinkability (data 
minimisation), intervenability, and transparency. 
 
 
Figure 5: The six data protection goals of the SDM 
 
These additional, privacy-focused goals can be used together with the classic IT security goals to assess 
and evaluate data protection and data security objectives and risks. Therein, they can be mapped exactly 
to the (often rather vague and broad) legal requirements of the European data protection framework. 
This approach is strongly aimed at determining the needed operational measures to resolve data pro-
tection issues, but which have the potential to enhance cybersecurity as well. Therefore, it may be a 
candidate methodology to receive more widespread recognition internationally, besides the efforts of 
the above-mentioned IT security and cybersecurity focused institutions to raise the prevalence of al-
ready known security standards.  
                                                          
223 For the direct linkage of the individual protection goals to the requirements of the GDPR, see ibid., p. 23ff. 
224 HANSEN, JENSEN and ROST, ‘Protection goals for privacy engineering’. 
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7. Conclusion 
As a general conclusion, we will summarise our main findings and suggest consequent actions. Let us 
first remember that people’s attitudes and opinions are by definition subjective. Perceived risks may not 
fully match real threats. Likewise, known security measures may not be the only ones in use, nor nec-
essarily the most adequate. Moreover, these results might be influenced by the intrinsic bias towards 
privacy of some of the surveys, especially those focussing on ways to go beyond the traditional trade-
off between security and privacy. 
For citizens, the biggest risk associated to cybersecurity generally seems to be privacy violation and the 
loss of data control. People seems to trust more public authorities than private entities with their per-
sonal data. They also perceive the increasing threat of cybercrime. They feel insufficiently informed 
about cybersecurity risks, which highlights the need to improve awareness: more information about 
current risks and concrete (counter)measures should be provided to a broader public. 
In the health sphere, citizens are especially sensitive to the handling of their health data. Consent and 
trust for the recording, processing, and storing of such data depend on the context. In the business 
sphere, citizens are also concerned with privacy infringements. There is a lack of trust in private busi-
nesses regarding the use of personal data, as well as a concern with internet and e-commerce security.  
In the police and national security sphere, there is diversity in the perception of the role of the state and 
of value-sensitive technologies such as DPI. Citizens find national security measures more acceptable if 
they view the state as a guardian rather than an intruder, which depends on their experience and their 
country’s history. Security technologies and their application scenarios should be carefully assessed be-
fore seeking public acceptance. However, we should not have to choose between (cyber) security and 
privacy, or any other value. We ought to keep a holistic view on all value-related topics.225 
Overall, most found data on citizens’ perspectives relates to general issues of security and privacy. The 
cyber component of security is often not emphasized in the studies. Further research is therefore 
needed to cover other values, but also to investigate specific issues such as cybersecurity and health, or 
cybersecurity in business. Besides, longitudinal surveys could study the influence of news stories on 
public opinion. For instance, what are acceptance levels of personal data collection before, during, and 
after privacy scandals (e.g. Snowden’s revelations)?226 
As for state actors, their attitudes and opinions are known to us mainly through policy documents. There 
already are EU institutions aiming to achieve comprehensive and harmonized governance of cyberse-
curity-related matters. But divisive factors still remain across member states, namely lack of clarity in 
understanding of cybersecurity and cybercrime, disparities in governance strategies and focus, as well 
as diverging willingness to commit resources. 
Does an attitude towards privacy leads to an attitude towards cybersecurity? The protection of personal 
information can also improve cybersecurity. For example, using a VPN when connected to a public 
hotspot (in an airport, in a hotel or in a shopping centre) prevents the communication to be eaves-
dropped by other users at this hotspot. In particular, personal identifying information is not visible any-
more. Therefore, using a VPN can be seen as an attitude towards privacy. A VPN also prevents the in-
terception and the stealing of the passwords at the hotspot. From this point of view, it is also an attitude 
towards cybersecurity. Thus, privacy and some aspects of (cyber)security can be mutually reinforcing. 
However, a VPN can also be used to lure content providers about the actual geolocation of a user. This 
is a way to circumvent location dependant DRM and intellectual properties. Such a use of a VPN is an 
                                                          
 This conclusion has been written by Florent WENGER and David-Olivier JAQUET-CHIFFELLE (University of Lausanne). 
225 Cf. PAVONE et al., ‘A systemic approach to security: beyond the tradeoff between security and liberty’. 
226 ‘PACT D-4.2: Survey report’, p. 2. ‘PRISMS D-10.1: Report on statistical analysis of survey’, p. 84. 
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attitude against some particular cybersecurity measures. This example illustrates how an attitude can 
protect privacy and at the same time be an attitude both towards and against cybersecurity: the use of 
a VPN prevents some personal identifying information leakage and protects certain cybersecurity assets 
while endangering some others. Cybersecurity is too vague or too broad to be considered as a mono-
lithic entity. It needs to be contextualized in order to assess the impact of a particular attitude, measure 
or action. Eventually, according to the Standard Data Protection Model, three new protection goals 
should be added to the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability): unlinkability, intervenability, and 
transparency. 
Ultimately, working towards value-driven cybersecurity goes beyond adding privacy requirements, alt-
hough it is a first, significant and welcome step. Both citizens’ perspectives and their direct involvement 
are crucial to enforce fundamental rights in the cyberspace and to contribute to a more secure, value-
driven information society.  
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Appendix  
A.1 EU Projects Overview 
See also A.4 References: EU projects 
Project Description Duration Countries in survey 
CONSENT Consumer sentiment regarding privacy 
It sought to examine how consumer behaviour 
and commercial practices are changing the role of 
consent in the processing of personal data. 
 
2010-2013 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, Po-
land, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, UK227 
PACT Public perception of security and privacy 
Its goal was to carry out a root and branch review 
of public perception of privacy and security, to col-
lect empirical evidence, and to translate research 
into a privacy framework and a decision support 
system. 
2012-2015 27 EU member states 
PRESCIENT 
 
Privacy and emerging sciences and technologies 
It aimed to identify and assess privacy issues 
posed by emerging sciences and technologies and 
to contribute to the development of new instru-
ments for the governance of science and technol-
ogy. 
2009-2012 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, The Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
PRISE Privacy enhancing shaping of security research and 
technology 
It provided guidelines and support for security so-
lutions with a particular emphasis on human 
rights, human behaviour and perception of secu-
rity and privacy. 
2007-2008 Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Hungary, Norway, 
Spain 
PRISMS Privacy and security mirrors 
It analysed the traditional trade-off model be-
tween privacy and security and worked towards a 
more evidence-based perspective for reconciling 
privacy and security, trust and concern. 
2012-2015 27 EU member states 
RESPECT Rules, expectations and security through privacy 
enhanced convenient technologies 
It addressed the role of surveillance systems and 
procedures in preventing and reducing crime, 
tracking evidence, and improvement of crime and 
acts of terrorism prosecution. 
2012-2015 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Italy, 
Malta, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden, UK228 
                                                          
227 Only 14 out of the 26 surveyed countries had respondent numbers which were sufficient for a meaningful quantitative 
analysis by country. 
228 For only 13 out of the 28 surveyed countries (EU plus Norway), the number of respondents met the required target quota 
to be representative. 
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Project Description Duration Countries in survey 
SMART Scalable measures for automated recognition 
technologies 
It examined the social and legal consequences of 
adoption of automated, “smart surveillance” sys-
tems by public bodies. 
2011-2014 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Malta, Nor-
way, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, the Neth-
erlands, UK 
SurPRISE Surveillance, privacy and security 
A large scale participatory assessment of criteria 
and factors determining acceptability and ac-
ceptance of security technologies in Europe. 
2014-2015 Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Nor-
way, Spain, Switzerland, 
UK 
 
A.2 Literature Search Methodology 
We searched for additional papers in two scientific databases, namely Scopus and Web of Science Core 
Collection.229 We started from the cybersecurity-related references found with the validated keyword 
set identified in the bibliometric study of CANVAS Work Package 1 (see White paper 1 for details). 
Then we refined these base results to obtain the empirical studies with the attitudes and opinions of 
European citizens on cybersecurity. After merging final results and removing all duplicates, this search 
yielded 1,131 unique references.  
In a second phase, we filtered these 1,131 references for each of our three social spheres of reference 
(health, business, police and national security) by following these steps: 
1. Filtering by title and abstract: 
- If no abstract was available, the first page of the paper was skimmed for relevance.  
- Inclusion criteria: empirical studies focusing on EU citizens’ attitudes or opinions regarding cy-
bersecurity, English papers between 1996 and 2016.  
- Exclusion criteria: empirical studies about non-EU citizens, non-English papers, papers outside 
of 1996-2016. 
- After removing 27 non-English papers, 1,104 papers remained. Among them, we found 22 
specific references for health, 23 for business, and 16 for police and national security. 
2. Full paper analysis: 
- The specific papers found were read. Among them, four empirical studies were in any signifi-
cant way related to EU citizens’ attitudes or opinions about cybersecurity in health, two were 
relevant for business, and one for police and national security. 
3. Snowballing: 
- We checked the bibliographies of the specific papers analysed. Each contributor, being an ex-
pert in the field, also used its overview knowledge of the relevant literature. Snowballing 
yielded four additional empirical studies for the health sphere. 
The fact that only very few papers have been found points to a clear research need. The results of this 
literature search are included in the above sections: 3. Citizens on cybersecurity in health, 4. Citizens 
on cybersecurity in business, 5. Citizens on cybersecurity in police and national security. 
 
 
                                                          
229 https://www.scopus.com/ – https://www.webofknowledge.com/ 
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A.3 Abbreviations 
BBK Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe 
(German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance) 
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(German Federal Office for Information Security) 
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
CNIL Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
(French Data Protection Authority) 
CoE Council of Europe 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
D- deliverable (document produced for an EU project) 
DPA Data Protection Authority 
DPI Deep Packet Inspection 
DPIA Data Protection Impact Assessment 
EC European Community 
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor 
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
EU European Union 
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
FP7 7th Framework Programme for research and technological Development 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
ICO UK Information Commissioner of the United Kingdom  
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
IoT Internet of Things 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
IT Information Technology 
LEA Law Enforcement Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIS Network and Information Security 
OJ Official Journal of the European Union. 
(It contains two series: L for legislation, C for information and notices.) 
PET Privacy Enhancing Technology 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
R&D Research and Development 
SET Secure Electronic Transaction 
SLT Smartphone Location Tracking 
SOST Surveillance-Oriented Security Technology 
T-CY Cybercrime Convention Committee (of the Council of Europe) 
UGC User Generated Content 
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EU projects 
See also A.1 EU Projects Overview 
CANVAS: constructing an alliance for value-driven cybersecurity: https://canvas-project.eu  
CONSENT: consumer sentiment regarding privacy: http://www.consent.law.muni.cz/  
‘CONSENT D-7.3: Synthesised all countries report’: Public deliverable, February 2013 (not available 
online) 
PACT: public perception of security and privacy: http://www.projectpact.eu  
‘PACT D-4.2: Survey report’: Public deliverable, 20 June 2014:  
http://www.projectpact.eu/deliverables/wp4-data-analysis/d4.2/D4.2.pdf/view  
‘PACT: Final report summary’: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/181728_en.html  
PRESCIENT: privacy and emerging sciences and technologies: http://www.prescient-project.eu 
‘PRESCIENT D-3: Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and emerging technologies’: Public 
deliverable, 16 May 2012: http://prescient-project.eu/prescient/inhalte/download/PRESCI-
ENT_Deliverable_3_Final.pdf  
PRISE: privacy enhancing shaping of security research and technology: http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at 
Supported by PASR (preparatory action on the enhancement of the European industrial poten-
tial in the field of security research) 
‘PRISE D-5.8: Synthesis report – interview meetings on security technology and privacy’: Public deliver-
able, April 2008: http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_D_5.8_Synthesis_report.pdf  
‘PRISE D-6.2: Criteria for privacy enhancing security technologies’: Public deliverable, 2008: 
http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_D_6.2_Criteria_for_privacy_enhancing_security_tech-
nologies.pdf  
‘PRISE D-7.6: Concluding conference statement paper’: Public deliverable (no date): 
http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_Statement_Paper.pdf  
PRISMS: privacy and security mirrors: http://prismsproject.eu 
‘PRISMS D-10.1: Report on statistical analysis of survey’: Public deliverable, 16 October 2015 (not avail-
able online) 
‘PRISMS D-9.1: Findings from qualitative focus groups’: Public deliverable, 29 October 2013: 
http://prismsproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/PRISMS-D9-1-Focus-Groups-Report.pdf  
‘PRISMS: Final report summary’: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/191772_en.html  
RESPECT: rules, expectations and security through privacy enhanced convenient technologies: 
http://respectproject.eu  
‘RESPECT D-11.3: Synthesised all countries report (quantitative data)’: Public deliverable, 19 May 2015 
(not available online) 
‘RESPECT: Periodic report summary 1’: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/153820_en.html  
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‘SMART: Report summary’: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/178069_en.html  
SurPRISE: surveillance, privacy and security: http://surprise-project.eu  
‘SurPRISE D-6.10: Synthesis report’: Public deliverable, February 2015: http://surprise-project.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/SurPRISE-D6.10-Synthesis-report.pdf  
‘SurPRISE D-6.12: Workshop report’: Public deliverable, December 2014: http://surprise-pro-
ject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SurPRISE-D6.12-Workshop-report.pdf  
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Degli Esposti, Vincenzo Pavone and Elvira Santiago: Joint conference of SurPRISE, PRISMS and 
PACT, Vienna, 13-14 November 2014: http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/11/Degli-Esposti_Aligning-security-and-privacy-en-route-toward-acceptable-surveil-
lance.pdf  
‘SurPRISE, PRISMS and PACT: Abstract booklet’ Citizens’ perspectives on surveillance, security and pri-
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2014: http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Booklet_Final.pdf  
‘SurPRISE: Report summary’: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/171903_en.html  
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‘Flash Eurobarometer 225: Data Protection in the European Union – Citizens’ Perception’ 
Analytical Report, The Gallup Organization (for the European Commission), 2008 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_225_en.pdf 
‘Global State of Information Security® Survey 2017’ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PwCIL) 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cyber-security/information-security-survey.html  
‘Special Eurobarometer 341: Biotechnology’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf  
‘Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Un-
ion’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf 
‘Special Eurobarometer 390: Cyber Security’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_390_en.pdf  
‘Special Eurobarometer 404: Cyber Security’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_404_en.pdf  
‘Special Eurobarometer 423: Cyber Security’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_423_en.pdf  
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‘Special Eurobarometer 432: Europeans' Attitudes towards Security’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf  
‘Special Eurobarometer 464a: Europeans' Attitudes towards Security’ 
Report, TNS Opinion & Social (for the European Commission), 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instru-
ments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2171  
Legislation and Policy Documents 
European Union 
‘Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and 
Combating Computer-related Crime’ 
European Commission, Communication COM/2000/890 final, Brussels, 26 January 2001 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0890  
‘Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union: an Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ 
European Commission, Joint communication JOIN/2013/1 final, Brussels, 7 February 2013 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0001  
‘Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the 
Union’ 
[2016] OJ L 194/1 (NIS Directive) 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj  
‘ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016’ 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), January 2017 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2016  
‘European Cybersecurity Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA) for a contractual Public-Pri-
vate-Partnership (cPPP)’ 
European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO), June 2016 
http://www.ecs-org.eu/documents/ecs-cppp-sria.pdf  
‘Opinion 8/2015 on Dissemination and use of intrusive surveillance technologies’ 
European Data Protection Supervisor (Giovanni Buttarelli), Brussels, 15 December 2015 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-12-15_intrusive_surveillance_en.pdf  
‘Opinion 9/2001 on the Commission Communication on “Creating a safer information society by im-
proving the security of information infrastructures and combating computer-related crime”’ 
Article 29 Working Party, WP 51, 5 November 2001 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommenda-
tion/files/2001/wp51_en.pdf  
‘Opinion on the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Euro-
pean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on a “Cyber Security Strategy of the European 
Union: an Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, and on the Commission proposal for a Directive 
concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security 
across the Union’ 
European Data Protection Supervisor (Peter Hustinx), Brussels, 14 June 2013 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/13-06-14_cyber_security_en.pdf  
‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the pro-
tection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC’ 
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[2016] OJ L 119/1 (General Data Protection Regulation) 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj  
‘Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cyberse-
curity Industry’ 
European Commission, Communication COM/2016/410 final, Brussels, 5 July 2016 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0410  
‘The EDPS Strategy 2015-2019’ 
European Data Protection Supervisor, Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg, 2015 
https://doi.org/10.2804/35559  
Other (non-EU) 
‘36th Activity Report 2015’ 
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), France 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_2015_gb.pdf 
‘Cyber Defence Pledge’ 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Press release (2016) 124, 8 July 2016 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm   
‘French National Digital Security Strategy’ 
République française, France, 2015 
https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/actualite/the-french-national-digital-security-strategy-meeting-the-
security-challenges-of-the-digital-world/  
‘National Cyber Security Strategy’ 
Gobierno de España, Spain, 2013 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-
map/NCSS_ESen.pdf  
‘National Cybersecurity Strategy II’ 
Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2015 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/Luxem-
bourg_Cyber_Security_strategy.pdf  
‘Privacy: working with business – Ten corporate best practices to improve your business’ 
Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, Italy 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/documents/10160/2416443/Privacy%3A+working+with+business-
vademecum.pdf  
‘The National Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’ 
Official Gazette No 108/2015, Zagreb, 7 October 2015 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-
map/CRNCSSEN.pdf  
‘The Standard Data Protection Model: a concept for inspection and consultation on the basis of unified 
protection goals’ 
German Data Protection Authorities, Kühlungsborn, 9-10 November 2016 
https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Datenschutz/Themen/Technische_Anwendungen/TechnischeAn-
wendungenArtikel/Standard-Datenschutzmodell.html 
See also: https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/sdm/  
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